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Abstract 
This article combines insights from the literature on revolutions with that on non-
violent protest in order to assess the causes and outcomes of the Arab Uprisings. The 
article makes three main arguments: first, international dynamics were the precipitant 
cause of the Arab Uprisings; second, because the region’s ‘neo-patrimonial’ regimes 
were particularly vulnerable to shifts in state-military relations, the hold of elites over 
state coercive apparatuses played a decisive role in determining the outcomes of the 
revolutions; and third, the organizational character of the protest movements, including 
their use of information and communication technologies, helped to raise levels of 
participation, but limited their capacity to engender major transformations. Of 
particular interest to scholarship on non-violent movements, the article demonstrates 
the ways in which, as the revolutionary wave spread around North Africa and the 
Middle East, protestors in states outside the original onset of the crisis overstated the 
possibilities of revolutionary success. At the same time, regimes learned quickly how to 
demobilize their opponents. The lesson is clear: the timing of when movements 
emerged was just as important as their organizational coherence and levels of 
participation.  
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Revolution in the Contemporary World1 
There are two main ways of approaching the study of revolution in the contemporary 
world – and they are both wrong. On the one hand, revolutions appear to be 
everywhere: on the streets of Cairo and Damascus; in the slogans of anti-austerity 
protestors; and in the potential of new technologies to reshape people’s lives. But can 
revolution really be popular protest, campaign against inequality, and technological 
breakthrough at the same time? This issue is further complicated by a second equally 
common, but apparently contradictory, meme – that revolutions are irrelevant to a 
world in which the big issues of governance and economic development have been 
settled. As Arno Mayer (2001: 3) puts it, in the contemporary world, revolutions appear 
to offer ‘little promise and pose little threat’. With the passing of state socialism in the 
Soviet Union, it is supposed, revolutions appear more as relics of a bygone age than as 
important points of reference. Both of these positions are untenable. While the former 
makes revolution so all-encompassing that it becomes an empty term without 
substantive content, the latter is overly complacent, failing to see the enduring appeal of 
attempts to overturn existing conditions and generate alternative social orders. The 
Arab Uprisings of 2011 are the latest reminder of the consistent appeal of revolutionary 
struggles.  
 
To point to the enduring appeal of revolutionary struggles does not mean homogenizing 
the experience of revolutions. Revolutions are not static objects of analysis, but 
processes that change in modality across time and place (Motyl 1999: 23; McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 13; Tilly 2006: 9). Revolutions have been conducted by 
nationalists in Algeria, communists in Afghanistan, Russia, and China, radical military 
groups in Ethiopia, peasants in Mexico, Islamists in Iran, and students in Egypt. At the 
same time, the concept of revolution exists in every major language group in the world. 
A full study of its etymology would need to take in the Greek concepts of epanastasis 
(revolution), the Arabic terms inqilab (to rotate) and thaura (revolution), the notions of 
mered (rebellion), hitkomemut (uprising), meri (revolt), and kesher (plot) in classical 
Hebrew, the Chinese word geming (change of life, fate, or destiny), and the Latin verb 
revolvere (to return) (Halliday 1999: 29-35). Probing deeper into the European meaning 
of the term reveals further diversity. In Ancient Greece, the idea of revolution was 
linked to a circular movement contained within Aristotle’s trinity of democracy, 
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oligarchy, and tyranny. In the Middle Ages, the concept was used to denote a return to a 
pre-existing order. During the nineteenth century, the republican revolutions of 
America and France became seen as archetypal, reaching their apogee in the 1848 
‘Springtime of Nations’. Following the emergence of communism, revolution became 
associated with inevitable, violent ruptures from one type of social order (capitalism) to 
another (socialism). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many commentators argued 
that revolution had conjoined with reform programs to generate a new category of 
‘refolution’ (Garton Ash 1989, 1990), or reconnected with older notions of return, as 
captured in Jürgen Habermas’s (1990) notion of ‘rectifying revolutions’. In the present 
day, as noted above, the study of revolution is increasingly caught between two 
extremes: denigration on the one hand; catch-all term on the other.  
 
Two preliminary points can be drawn from this brief survey: first, revolutions shift in 
modality according to their temporal-spatial context; and second, revolutions remain 
important sites of struggle (and, potentially, important tools of analysis) in the 
contemporary world. But what form do contemporary revolutions assume? This article 
brings together the literature on revolutions with that on non-violent protest in order to 
assess the most recent wave of revolutions: the 2011 Arab Uprisings. It makes three 
main arguments: first, international dynamics were the precipitant cause of the Arab 
Uprisings; second, because the region’s ‘neo-patrimonial’ regimes were particularly 
vulnerable to shifts in state-military relations, the hold of elites over state coercive 
apparatuses played a decisive role in determining the outcomes of the revolutions; and 
third, the organizational form assumed by the protest movements, including their use of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs), helped to raise levels of 
participation, but limited their capacity to engender major transformations. These 
arguments shed light on the changing character of contemporary revolutionary 
movements; they also help to elucidate their strengths and weaknesses.  
 
Revolution and Non-Violent Protest 
What were the main causes of the Arab Uprisings? Research highlights three main 
factors that lead to the emergence of revolutionary situations: changes in international 
relations, such as degrees of dependent development, shifting client-patron networks, 
and the emergence of novel transnational discursive fields (Goldfrank 1979; Skocpol 
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1979; Hobsbawm 1986; Halliday 1999; Lawson 2004, 2015; Adamson 2005; Foran 
2005; Beck 2011; Tarrow 2012; Goldstone 2014a; Ritter 2015); the vulnerability of 
certain types of regime, particularly neo-patrimonial orders that combine personalized 
rule with a degree of legal-rational functioning (Eisenstadt 1973; Mann 1984; Chehabi 
and Linz eds. 1998; Goodwin 2001; Goldstone 2009; Bunce and Wolchik 2011); and a 
systemic crisis rooted in a conjuncture of political-coercive, (relative) economic, and 
symbolic crisis (Halliday 1999; Goldstone 2003; Lawson 2004; Foran 2005; Goldstone 
2014a). However, revolutionary situations rarely lead to successful revolutions. Again, 
research highlights three main dynamics that lie behind successful revolutions: levels of 
state effectiveness (Goldstone 1991, 2001, 2003; Goodwin 2001; Foran 2005); the hold 
of an elite over the coercive apparatus (Russell 1974; Moore 1978; Tilly 1978, 1995; 
Goldstone 1991; Bellin 2012; Nepstad 2013); and the organizational coherence of an 
opposition through the use of ‘social technologies’ ranging from revolutionary stories to 
networks of social movements, political parties, labor organizations, and places of 
worship (Tilly 2006, 2008; Selbin 2010; Alexander 2011; Tarrow 2012).  
 
This last point is worth particular consideration. It is often noted that there is little 
‘adhesive’ within contemporary revolutionary movements that can act as the binding 
agent of a new social order (e.g. Dunn 2008: 25). This means that, for all the amendable 
conditions for revolution in the contemporary world, and for all the willing capacity of 
many publics around the world to demand radical change, there is little sense of what 
an alternative order would look like once such trajectories are underway. To the 
contrary, contemporary revolutionary movements, from the Maidan movement in 
Ukraine to Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement, tend to be diffused rather than centralized 
in character (Foran 2003; Beissinger 2007).2 These movements promote self-
organization and autonomous action, eschewing the need for a vanguard party that will 
organize protest and mobilize people to action. Such a configuration resembles the 
structure of many other contemporary radical movements from Spain’s Indignados 
(‘Outraged’) to various ‘First Nations’ alliances. All of these movements endorse 
resistance to existing conditions. But few have a sense of how this resistance is to be 
realized or what would happen if their actions were to be successful. In other words, the 
dilemma facing revolutionary movements in the contemporary world is not whither 
struggle, but to what end these struggles lead (Halliday 2003; Callinicos 2008). 
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A focus on the organizational logics of contemporary revolutionary movements 
provides a segue into debates around non-violent protest. Scholarship interrogating the 
rise and impact of non-violent movements has made clear that such methods are not 
new (Zunes 1994; Ackerman and Duvall 2001; Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005; 
Nepstad 2011; Roberts and Garton Ash eds. 2011). At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, revolutionaries in Russia, Iran, Turkey, and elsewhere sought radical change 
not through violent overthrow, but through struggles that shifted sovereignty away 
from imperial courts towards representative assemblies, written constitutions, and 
legal-rational bureaucracies (Sohrabi 1995; Kurzman 2008). This form of struggle, 
sustained via civil rights campaigns in parts of South Asia, southern Africa, and North 
America, has become increasingly regularized since the 1970s. Of the 67 authoritarian 
regimes dismantled between 1972 and 2002, over 70% were the result of non-violent 
uprisings (Nepstad 2001: 4-5). A key conduit here is the work of Gene Sharp (1973), 
which highlights the potential of around 200 methods of non-violent action, from the 
withdrawal of labour to the imposition of boycotts. More recent work has focused on 
the ‘non-institutional’, transgressive dimensions of non-violent protest, such as 
occupations, which take place outside formal legal channels (Schock 2005: 6). 
Advocates stress the advantages of non-violent repertoires in: widening participation 
and broadening coalitions (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011); ratcheting-up international 
pressure on incumbents (Ritter 2015); and inducing defections within the ruling elite, 
thereby weakening the ‘sanctioning power’ of the state (Nepstad 2011, 2013). As a 
result, it is claimed, non-violent campaigns have been twice as successful as violent 
struggles (Chenoweth and Stephan 2008: 9). These strategies have been adopted – and 
adapted – by a range of contemporary revolutionary movements, from those that 
ousted state bureaucratic regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, to the 2011 
uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East.  
 
As the literature on non-violent protest has developed, it has taken two main forms. The 
first concentrates on dynamics within opposition movements. For Wendy Pearlman 
(2011), non-violent strategies can only be sustained by a movement with high levels of 
internal cohesion. An ‘organizational structure of cohesion’ enforces discipline 
(ensuring restraint, heightening credibility, and enhancing solidarity), cultivates clear 
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strategies (infusing participants with a clear sense of collective purpose), and promotes 
resilience (particularly in the face of regime coercion) (Pearlman 2011: 11-12, 22; also 
see Nepstad 2011: 131-3). A fragmented movement, by way of contrast, has a greater 
chance of becoming violent (Pearlman 2011: 14-20). Erica Chenoweth and Maria 
Stephan (2011: 17, 82) argue that the ‘strategic advantages’ of non-violent protest lie in 
its capacity to mobilize mass publics and delegitimize adversaries. The staying power of 
diverse, mass participation movements, it is argued, can prompt ‘loyalty shifts’ within 
state security services that, in turn, increase the likelihood of success (Chenoweth and 
Stephan 2011: 46-50). A second strand of literature is more ‘structural’. Daniel Ritter 
(2015), for example, sees the international context as crucial to the capacity of non-
violent movements to engender change. Ritter (2015: 5) emphasizes the ways in which 
an international context characterized by the ‘iron cage of liberalism’ traps 
authoritarian states into accepting at least the rudiments of democratic practices, from 
holding elections to permitting the formation of human rights councils (also see 
Levitsky and Way 2010; Bunce and Wolchik 2011). Although these practices are 
intended to be little more than a ‘façade’, their unintended consequence is to open up 
authoritarian regimes to scrutiny from domestic and international audiences (Ritter 
2015: 63). If authoritarian regimes are to maintain the material benefits of ties with 
Western states, from arms to aid, then they must open up a space for non-violent 
opposition to emerge – the structural context of international liberalism provides an 
opening within which domestic non-violent opposition can mobilize. Sharon Nepstad 
(2011: 129-31) complements Ritter’s analysis of the structural factors that ‘open the 
door’ to non-violent protest movements through attention to the actions of state 
security forces. For Nepstad (2011, 2013), it is these actions that largely determine the 
success or failure of non-violent movements. Defections from, or the unreliability of, 
security forces are far more likely when opposition protests are non-violent, 
particularly if this is combined with coercive forces that have little stake in the regime 
and that share forms of identity with opposition movements, such as a common religion 
or ethnicity (Nepstad 2013: 339, 342-3).3 
 
This article combines the literature on non-violent protest with existing work on 
revolutions in order to assess the causes and outcomes of the 2011 Arab Uprisings. It 
does so by highlighting the centrality of three causal factors: first, the role of 
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international dynamics in providing the context for the revolutions; second, the critical 
nature of the hold of elites over state coercive apparatuses; and third, the ways in which 
opposition movements maintained high levels of participation, in part because of their 
use of information and communication technologies, but lacked sufficient cohesion to 
foster projects of state transformation. Taken together, these three factors illustrate the 
need for analyses that stresses the role of international context, coercive solidarity, and 
the organizational coherence of an opposition – in that order. The next section of the 
paper discusses these factors in turn. The conclusion extends this analysis by assessing 
the divergent outcomes of the Arab Uprisings and what their trajectories tell us about 
the place of revolution in the contemporary world.  
 
International dynamics 
The first contention of this article is that international dynamics acted as the precipitant 
cause of the 2011 Arab Uprisings. This section concentrates on Egypt both for reasons 
of space and because Egypt is, for most observers, the ‘pivotal case’ (Bunce 2013) 
within the 2011 revolutionary wave. There are three ways in which international 
dynamics fuelled the 2011 uprising in Egypt. First, client-patron relations destabilized 
the legitimacy of the Egyptian state. Most notably, Egypt’s ties to the United States and 
Israel were deeply unpopular amongst the general public. In the years leading up to the 
Arab Uprisings, Egypt was the second largest recipient of US aid (worth around $1 
billion dollars per year in military aid alone), one of the main sites for the torture and 
rendition of suspected al-Qaida suspects, and a backer of Israeli policies in the region, 
including the blockade of Gaza.4 These policies generated a sense of alienation between 
the regime and the people. According to the 2010 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 82% of 
Egyptians strongly disapproved of the United States (up from 69% five years earlier). 
Opposition to the regime’s support for the US and Israel also found its way onto the 
street: there were large scale protests in solidarity with the second Palestinian intifada 
in 2000 and even larger protests following the onset of the 2003 Iraq war. These 
protests helped to forge ties that, in turn, sustained the 2011 uprising (Gunning and 
Baron 2013; Cole 2014; Ritter 2015).  
 
A second international component of the 2011 uprising in Egypt can be found in the 
reforms instituted by the Mubarak regime in response to international dynamics. 
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During the 1990s, pressure from international financial institutions to ‘open up’ saw the 
Mubarak regime institute a range of neoliberal policies: the reduction of tariffs, the 
abandoning of interest rate controls, and the removal of import quotas (Dodge 2012; 
Tripp 2013; Cole 2014). This served to intensify state dependence on Suez, aid, 
remittances, and tourism, making the Egyptian economy more susceptible to 
international markets. A dip in commodity prices during the mid-1990s forced the state 
to further leverage its debt and reduce public expenditure. The subsequent austerity 
measures prompted a decline in living standards for much of the population, even as a 
‘network of privilege’ (many of whom were associated with Gamal Mubarak, the 
President’s son), used personal connections with state brokers to secure lucrative 
contracts (Cole 2014: 36-42). The conspicuous consumption of this elite network meant 
that they were increasingly seen as a minority caste operating outside, or on top of, civil 
society. At the same time, worsening living standards stimulated opposition around the 
loss of dignity (al-karama) associated with the degrading of social conditions 
(Alexander 2011: 5-8). Between 2004-8, Egypt went through the most sustained period 
of labor unrest in its history: over 1.7 million Egyptians took part in nearly 2000 strikes 
(Ritter 2015: 160). Although the scale of this unrest dropped in the years immediately 
preceding the 2011 uprising, the significance of the strikes lay in the forging of robust 
opposition networks and the challenges these posed to state authority (Beinin and 
Vairel 2013; Gunning and Baron 2013; Cole 2014).  
 
The implementation of neoliberalism in Egypt went hand-in-hand with the 
implementation of ‘façade democracy’. Following the end of the Cold War, democracy 
promotion assumed a higher profile for many Western states, particularly the US, and 
international organizations (Levitsky and Way 2010; Ritter 2015). Although democracy 
promotion was often ‘low intensity’, it led the Mubarak regime to permit the formation 
of a number of human rights groups. It also led to the holding of multi-party elections. 
These elections were not ‘level playing fields’ – to the contrary, competition was ‘real, 
but unfair’ (Levitsky and Way 2010: 5). But even if incumbent power was skewed 
through control of the media, superior spending power, intimidation, and, occasionally, 
outright coercion (Levitsky and Way 2010: 13, 62-6, 72), Mubarak’s regime was 
nonetheless forced to recognize a legal opposition. In the 2005 elections, the Muslim 
Brotherhood won every parliamentary seat in which they entered a candidate. Even 
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given an environment of deeply circumscribed competition, opposition victories 
became a regular feature of Egyptian politics during the late 2000s. In November 2010, 
allegations of vote rigging by Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) intended to 
limit its electoral defeat only served to further weaken Mubarak’s position. In turn, 
these defeats marked a shift in opposition strategies away from direct confrontation 
with the state towards the embracing of formal constitutional and democratic 
procedures (Ritter 2015: 131). In sum: the structural conditions forged by changing 
international dynamics constructed a new operating environment that served to 
delegitimize the regime and prompt a shift in opposition strategies (Ritter 2015: 132). 
This not only raised levels of day-to-day opposition to the Mubarak regime, it also 
served to make processes such as elections much more important. Opposition 
movements watched closely as authoritarian regimes were ousted through the ballot 
box in Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia during the 2000s. The high degree of leverage 
enjoyed by Western states and international organizations over the Egyptian state 
regime meant that such dynamics also worked to destabilize the Mubarak regime 
(Levitsky and Way 2010: 71-2).  
 
The final way that international dynamics served as the precipitant cause of the 2011 
uprisings was through the power of example, whether this came about through 
demonstration effect or deliberate emulation (Beissinger 2007; Patel, Bunce, and 
Wolchik 2011; Weyland 2012). In the post-Cold War era, revolutionary waves appear to 
be intensifying as liberal markets, democratization, and ideas of individual autonomy 
(as vested in the human rights regime) foster a set of transgressive repertoires that 
threaten the hold of authoritarian regimes (Beck 2011; Beissinger 2014). The Arab 
Uprisings were the latest in a long wave of revolutions that encompassed the collapse of 
communism in Eastern and Central Europe as well as later movements in Serbia, 
Georgia, Ukraine, Lebanon, and elsewhere. In early 2011, the demonstration effect of 
the protests in Tunisia and Egypt spread quickly around the region and beyond, 
spurring movements in Mauritania, Djibouti, and Sudan as well as those in Bahrain, 
Syria, Yemen, Oman, Libya, and Jordan. This effect was sustained by the transnational 
diffusion of revolutionary repertoires, whether through impersonal networks (such as 
forms of media) or the personal connections fostered by protestors in different 
countries (Bunce and Wolchik 2007: 93-7; Tarrow 2012: 174). These transnational 
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networks circulated strategies, slogans, and forms of organization. They also formed 
part of a ‘transnational public sphere’ that fostered a unified set of ‘Arab issues’ (Lynch 
2011: 302; Lynch 2012: 10-1). Media outlets, from al-Jazeera to the independent 
Egyptian newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm, reported where the mainstream media could 
not, evading state capture and helping to galvanize new solidarities (Lynch 2011: 309; 
Lynch 2012: 11). In this way, a new media environment served as a direct interface 
between publics and elites, helping to promote solidarities between opposition groups 
in different countries and, in turn, working as ‘emotional triggers’ that decreased fear of 
the regime, while heightening feelings of hope and solidarity within opposition 
movements. All around the region, protestors chanted ‘We are not afraid’ during ‘Days 
of Rage’ intended to foster not just domestic uprisings, but a transnational 
revolutionary wave (Bellin 2012: 136; Pearlman 2013).  
 
The role of the coercive apparatus 
Opposition groups around the region were, therefore, given space to manoeuvre by the 
‘expanded access’ fostered by shifts in international ties and the ‘unstable alignments’ 
that arose from the failure of regimes to cope effectively with these shifts (Tarrow 
2012: 78-80; also see Ritter 2015). But international dynamics did not cause the 
revolutions by themselves. Crucial to the emergence of the revolutionary wave in 2011 
was the weakening of the region’s ‘neo-patrimonial’ regimes, which combined 
personalized rule with a degree of legal-rational functioning (Eisenstadt 1973; Weber 
1978[1922]). For many years, these regimes appeared stable, so much so that a good 
deal of the literature on the region revolved around the resilience of authoritarianism in 
the Middle East (e.g. Bellin 2004). However, over time, patrimonial rule, personality 
cults, and the use of arbitrary force failed to substitute for the lack of institutional 
buffers between exclusionary states and civil societies (Bellin 2004: 145-6). The lack of 
intermediate associations between state and society meant that elites were insulated 
from the people, finding few effective channels by which to meet grievances and 
institutionalize contestation. This served to ‘hollow out’ state-society relations, making 
regimes vulnerable to surges of discontent from below. Such discontent, ranging from 
strikes to assassinations and from flash mobs to occupations, was a regular feature of 
contentious politics in the region, even if its main effect was to strengthen the position 
of the security apparatus. States in the region could subjugate their people, but they 
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lacked the institutional depth to regulate society efficiently. In short, they were ‘fierce’, 
but not ‘strong’ (Ayubi 1995: xi).  
 
This combination of changing international dynamics and state vulnerability combined 
to generate a systemic crisis in many states in the region, as illustrated again by the 
example of Egypt. Before the 2011 uprising, the legitimacy of the Egyptian state rested 
on three main pillars: the 1952 revolution; the role of the military in freeing Egypt from 
Western hegemony (particularly the nationalization and subsequent conflict over Suez); 
and the ‘socialist development’ policies pursued by Nasser, during which the state took 
over the planning, coordination, and management of production. This had the effect of 
demobilizing social forces, including private landholders and the bourgeoisie, by using 
land reform and industrialization as tools for exerting state authority over economic 
activities (Dodge 2012: 6-7).5 It also led to reasonable levels of state-led growth, 
fortified by price subsidies that made basic commodities affordable to the majority of 
the population. State income was further generated through aid, particularly from the 
US, which as indicated above, paid handsomely in exchange for Egypt’s recognition of 
Israel following the 1979 Camp David Accords, its opposition to Iran, the suppression of 
Islamists (including the execution of the ‘Islamist Lenin’ – Sayyid Qutb), and the regular 
passage of US warships through the Suez Canal.  
 
As also noted above, a range of international dynamics, including the state’s embracing 
of neoliberalism and its turn to ‘façade democracy’, served to eat away at the legitimacy 
of the Mubarak regime. A vast security establishment was constructed on the back of 
two million informants, who underpinned an extensive system of policing, state 
security, and state-sponsored gangs (baltagiyya). At the same time, demographic 
changes (particularly population growth) placed additional burdens on the state. By 
2011, around one third of the Egyptian population was aged 15-29 (Shehata 2011: 28; 
also see Cole 2014). This exerted considerable pressures on job markets, just as the 
state was becoming more neoliberal, more personalistic, and more repressive. In 2009, 
unemployment in the region reached nearly 25%; many more were in informal, 
insecure work (Goldstone 2011: 12; Gunning and Baron 2013: 149). Unemployment 
rates were even higher amongst young people and disproportionately felt within the 
middle class – college graduates in Egypt were ten times more likely to have no job as 
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those with only a primary school education (Goldstone 2011: 12). Short-term triggers 
added to the sense of state failure. Between 2008-10, food prices increased by over a 
third (Dodge 2012: 11; Gunning and Baron 2013: 134). The simultaneous removal of 
food subsidies (the bread subsidy alone cost the state $3 billion per year) fuelled 
resentment against the regime; over two-fifths of Egyptians lived at or below the 
poverty line (Abdelrahman 2013: 574; Gunning and Baron 2013: 131). Despite the 
decline in its economic sovereignty after two decades of neoliberal reforms, the 
legitimacy of the Egyptian state was tightly bound with its capacity to guarantee a basic 
standard of living. It was, therefore, particularly susceptible to such crisis. To most 
Egyptians, it seemed like the state had abandoned the poor for the sake of the rich.  
 
By 2011, Egypt, like many other states in the region, was home to a neo-patrimonial 
state sustained by ‘repressions, payoffs, and elite solidarity’ (Quandt 1998: 30). 
Networks of crony capitalists secured profits through personal connections, while the 
majority of the population had seen their living standards fall, often quite dramatically. 
State and society were held together only through an extensive coercive apparatus – 
and it was this apparatus that largely determined the fate of the protests. While state, 
military, and security services remained aligned, Mubarak’s position was stable. If this 
alliance fractured, then his position was far more tenuous. Despite this vulnerability, the 
Egyptian regime was slow to respond to the threat posed by the December 2010 
protests in Tunisia, even after the Tunisian President Zine Ben Ali stood down on 14th 
January. On 25th January, protestors called for a ‘Day of Rage’, chosen because it was a 
national holiday (Police Day) marking the anniversary of a massacre of police officers 
by the British in 1952. From this point on, protests spread in both breadth (reaching 
Alexandria, Suez, Ismailia, and other parts of the country) and depth (upscaling from 
tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of people). Although protestors formally 
embraced non-violence (silmiyya), resistance was shown to state forces and the 
baltagiyya, not least in the popular quarters of Cairo, by organized groups of soccer fans 
(‘Ultras’), and in the mass burning down of police stations around the country (Ismail 
2012; Dorsey 2012).6 Many hundreds of protestors were killed by state security forces 
(Holmes 2012: 397-9; Gunning and Baron 2013: 2).  
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As protests intensified, Mubarak’s hold on power was weakened by contradictory 
dynamics of concession and repression. On the concession side: the President promised 
to resign at the end of his term of office; on the repression side: violence against 
protestors escalated. These contradictory dynamics served to splinter the coercive 
apparatus, sapping Mubarak’s support within the police, his party, and the military. 
Large numbers of police failed to show up for work, took off their badges, or went over 
to the protestors. On 5th February, the entire executive committee of the NDP was 
forced to resign, including Gamal Mubarak. As the protests escalated, the military 
pursued a ‘double game’: permitting protests to continue (so as to weaken the position 
of state officials vis-à-vis the military), while simultaneously containing them (so as to 
restrict the capacity of the protests to radically reshape military prerogatives) (Stein 
2012: 24). However, the removal of Gamal Mubarak and his associates from formal 
positions of authority reduced the need for intra-elite competition. At the same time, the 
close association drawn between the protestors struggle and the military (as in the 
notion of the ‘one hand’ shared by the people and the army against the regime) pushed 
the military closer to the protests (Stein 2012: 24). At first, the military refused to fire 
on the protestors and protected them from state-sponsored violence, albeit selectively. 
But on 10th February, the military publicly endorsed the people’s ‘legitimate demands’. 
Mubarak resigned the next day. The head of the General Intelligence Service, Omar 
Suleiman, was left to oversee a transfer of power to the Supreme Council of Armed 
Forces, which opened negotiations on a new constitution and elections.  
 
These events make clear two points. First, the patrimonialism of the Mubarak regime 
made it vulnerable to both elite fracture and surges of discontent – it was despotically 
strong, but infrastructurally weak (Mann 1984; Goodwin 2001). The gap between rich 
and poor, and state and society, plus the everyday brutality of the security apparatus, 
made the regime susceptible to extended contention from below. Such contention was a 
regular feature of Egyptian political life for many decades; it took increasingly acute 
form during the 2000s (Beinin and Vairel 2013). During this period, the regime was 
held together through a combination of elite pacts and shared rents. This highlights the 
importance of a second, linked, point: the defection of the Egyptian military made 
Mubarak’s position untenable (Bellin 2012: 130). By early 2011, the effectiveness of the 
Egyptian state, like that of many of its counterparts in North Africa and the Middle East, 
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had been eroded through shifts in international relations, rising levels of inequality, 
corruption, cronyism, and widespread contention. In this context of weakening state 
effectiveness, the defection of the armed forces was crucial. Where this took place (as in 
Tunisia and Egypt), autocrats were ousted. Where the military and the regime remained 
united, protests were either decompressed (as in the Gulf monarchies) or became 
bloody (as in Syria). These divergent outcomes are the subject of the final section of the 
paper. For now, it is worth noting that autocrats in the region often sought to coup-
proof their regimes by constructing security apparatuses that could counter-balance the 
military (Bou Nassif 2014). However, even as this strategy reduced the likelihood of 
coups from above, it made autocrats vulnerable to popular surges from below by 
reducing the stake of the military in the regime. In Egypt, for example, the spoils of the 
‘military economy’ were unevenly distributed. While high-ranking officers benefitted 
directly from their close relationship with state and corporate elites, junior officers and 
the rank-and-file were left out of the spoils. This, in turn, made them more likely to 
defect in the face of concerted opposition movements (Nepstad 2013: 342-3, 345).  
 
The organizational character of opposition movements 
As noted in the previous section, it is often claimed that contemporary revolutionary 
movements lack the coherence of previous movements. Indeed, over recent years, there 
has been a pronounced shift away from the hierarchical vision espoused by vanguard 
revolutionary parties towards a flatter structure associated with popular coalitions.7 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the coalition that deposed Mubarak was made up of disparate 
forces, including labor groups, urban youths, students, professionals, and religious 
groups, which were only loosely organized.8 But if, as argued by much of the literature 
on non-violent protest, organizational coherence is critical to the success of popular 
coalitions (e.g. Pearlman 2011), how can relatively flat, somewhat amorphous 
movements be sustained? Interrogation of the ways the opposition coalition in Egypt 
attempted to construct a coherent movement provides a number of insights into this 
question.  
 
During the 2011 Arab Uprisings, it is argued, popular coalitions were unified in large 
part through information and communication technologies (e.g. Brooke 2011; Howard 
and Hussain 2011; Simmons 2011; Walgrave, Bennett, Van Laer, and Breunig 2011; 
 15 
Hussain and Howard 2013). Particularly important in this respect was the role played 
by ‘wired cosmopolitans’, mostly young, well-travelled, technologically savvy 
professionals, who coordinated opposition activities and translated local events for 
foreign media. Three-quarters of the social media traffic around Egypt’s ‘25 January’ 
revolution came from outside the region, while 90% of tweets about the uprising 
originated from outside Egypt (Aday, Farrell, Lynch, Sides, and Freelon 2012: 11-13); 
Brym, Godbout, Hoffbauer, Menard, and Zhang 2014: 269-70). The coordinating role of 
these wired cosmopolitans, and ICTs more generally, is a crucial issue in assessing the 
organizational character of the protest movements. If they are unable to sustain unity, 
popular coalitions are unlikely to generate programmes of state transformation, even if 
they succeed in ousting an unpopular ruler. Indeed, mass participation, often hailed as a 
necessary cause of both non-violent protest and democratic outcomes (e.g. Chenoweth 
and Stephan 2011), may act against the fostering of organizational coherence. Without a 
means of uniting a fragmented, often hastily constructed opposition, the impact of 
protests is likely to be limited. In short: opposition requires organizing. For some 
analysts and protestors, ICTs were this organizational vehicle during the 2011 protests, 
providing a means through which messages were shared, grievances were aired, and 
abuses were documented (Howard and Hussain 2011: 36; Cole 2014: 8-13). For ICT 
enthusiasts, technologies have the capacity to perform several key functions: overcome 
collective action problems, reshape political opportunities, connect previously 
fragmented sites of opposition, and mobilize people to action (Ayres 1999; Bennett et al 
2008; Brooke 2011; Simmons 2011; Walgrave et al 2011; Bennett and Segerberg 2013). 
In this way, ICTs are said to have transformed the organization, vision, and strategies of 
Arab protest movements. By fostering movements out of reach of formal sites of 
political authority, particularly the state, and by sharing information both immediately 
and without official sanction, it is argued that ICTs provide the ‘digital scaffolding’ for a 
new type of politics (Simmons 2011: 590; Hussain and Howard 2013: 64).  
 
As with the adoption by many Arab opposition movements of non-violent strategies, the 
connection between ICTs and mass protests does not begin with the 2011 uprisings. 
Cell phones and text messages played an important role in the ‘Orange Revolution’ in 
Ukraine in 2004. And social media began to be seen as a major influence on mass 
uprisings following the extensive use of YouTube during the 2007 ‘Saffron Revolution’ 
 16 
in Burma, the 2009 ‘Twitter Revolution’ in Moldova, and the ‘Green Revolution’ in Iran 
later that year. Such associations were given extra impetus by a high-profile speech in 
2010 by US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton (2010), who argued that ‘the spread of 
information networks are forming a new nervous system for our planet’. The Internet, 
Clinton claimed, provided the first ever ‘global networked commons’. Comparing 
bloggers to dissidents and social media to samizdat, Clinton (2010) argued that the 
Internet ‘is like Radio Free Europe on steroids’. She went on to announce a range of 
policies designed to break down ‘virtual walls’ and secure ‘Internet freedom’. Leading 
advisers such as Alec Ross and Jared Cohen were charged with pursuing this ‘21st 
century statecraft’ (Cull 2013: 134). There were well-publicized visits to Iraq (where 
the retinue included Jack Dorsey, founder of Twitter) and Colombia, where officials met 
with Oscar Morales, the web designer who used Facebook to generate a campaign 
against FARC guerrillas.  
 
The Arab Uprisings, therefore, fit smoothly within existing academic and political 
understandings of the relationship between ICTs and democratization. But to what 
extent did such technologies help to cohere opposition groups? Once again, it is worth 
examining the case of Egypt. There is little doubt that Facebook played some role in 
organizing protests in Egypt. The Facebook group Kulina Khaled Said (‘We Are All 
Khaled Said’), established in commemoration of a blogger murdered by Egyptian police 
in 2010, gathered hundreds of thousands of members, many of whom took part in 
demonstrations against the regime. The widely circulated autopsy photo of Khaled Said 
served a mobilizing function comparable to the video of Nedā Āghā-Soltān, the Iranian 
protestor shot dead by police during the 2009 ‘Green Revolution’, which became a 
potent point of connection between protestors inside the country and transnational 
networks. Such points of connection usually circulated outside formal media outlets, 
whether public or private, many of which were distrusted by Arab publics. These 
informally circulated videos, photos, and messages served as ‘information cascades’, 
highlighting regime brutality and fuelling a sense of outrage (Lynch 2011, 2012). They 
also acted as connecting nodes between otherwise disparate networks, energizing 
empathetic cascades that ratcheted up pressure on elites to ‘do something’ (Walgrave et 
al 2011: 329). During major events, such as the removal of Hosni Mubarak, these 
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cascades helped to foster sharp spikes in the use of digital media (Hussain and Howard 
2013: 57; Brym et al 2014: 270). 
 
Such dynamics certainly worried Arab states. At the end of January 2011, the Egyptian 
government required the country’s main Internet Service Provider’s (ISPs) to disable 
their networks. The government also asked Vodafone for details on subscribers and 
used the network to send out pro-regime texts. After five days, however, the 
government lifted its blockade, seeing the ban as igniting rather than suppressing 
dissent. In other words, more people came onto the streets once the Internet had been 
disabled. This is a puzzling outcome given claims about the necessity of ICTs in 
mobilizing protest. Some protestors may have been able to workaround the blackout via 
smartphones or alternative means of communication (Lynch 2012: 90). For the most 
part, though, the shutdown worked. But if protestors are supposed to have required 
ICTs in order to solve collective action problems, connect disparate networks, and 
coordinate activities, it is curious that protests in Egypt intensified during the period in 
which the Internet was disabled.  
 
Perhaps this is not such a puzzle. As even the most animated cyber-enthusiasts accept, 
digital data leaves an audit trail, one that can be used for surveillance and censorship as 
well as for autonomy and transparency (e.g. Brooke 2011: 233-5; Lynch 2011: 306; 
Hussain and Howard 2013: 50, 60). Social media is often appropriated by authoritarian 
governments in order to trace protestors, spread propaganda, and monitor the 
activities of protest groups. This is something that many activists appear to recognize. 
In January 2011, a pamphlet entitled ‘How to Protest Intelligently’ was circulated widely 
amongst protest groups in Egypt. The pamphlet explicitly asked protestors not to use 
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, or other websites because, ‘they are all monitored by the 
Ministry of the Interior’.9 After the 2009 Green Revolution, the Iranian government 
formed a cybercrime unit charged with countering the ‘American led cyber-war’ and 
arresting those guilty of spreading ‘insults and lies’ about the regime through the 
Internet (Morozov 2011: 10). The Chinese government has constructed a ‘Great 
Firewall’ around the Internet and has become adept at initiating ‘online blockades’. A 
number of authoritarian states are well versed in carrying out ‘Distributed Denial of 
Service’ attacks, while the Internet has proved to be a valuable source of authoritarian 
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propaganda. Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party, for example, enjoys an extensive 
online presence, using the Internet as a tool for spreading its messages. In short, 
autocratic regimes are skilled practitioners when it comes to adopting ‘networked’ 
techniques of surveillance and control (MacKinnon 2011; Morozov 2011).  
 
On the one hand, therefore, ICTs can help to coordinate revolutionary protests. On the 
other hand, they can be used equally well to disrupt these protests. To put this another 
way, the utility of ICTs depends on how they are embedded within wider fields of 
action. At times, ICTs serve as ‘echo bubbles’ rather than ‘tools of connection’, 
amplifying in-group communication and reinforcing existing sentiments (Pariser 2011; 
Aday et al 2012). This means that ICTs can foster a dialogue of the deaf as easily as they 
encourage a unifying narrative. And even this dialogue takes place unevenly. Internet 
penetration rates in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 were not particularly 
high. Fewer than 8% of Egyptians were registered Facebook users in April 2011, while 
131,000 had active twitter accounts (0.15% of the population); less than 10% of 
Egyptians say that Internet news sites or social media were their principal sources of 
information during the 2011 uprising (Brym et al 2014: 269-70). This may be a 
strategically important minority (Howard and Hussain 2011: 47), but such figures still 
suggest that a digital divide is in operation which is a long way removed from hopes of 
fostering a single virtual commons. Nor is there evidence that the ways in which ICTs 
‘internationalize’ protests by connecting local struggles with transnational circuits had a 
pronounced effect on domestic elites (Brym et al 2014). Those who see ICTs as valuable 
instruments of mobilization would do well to concentrate less on social media (which 
are rarely used) than on cell phones (which are commonplace). And they would do even 
better to relax assumptions about the requirement of ICTs to revolutionary movements. 
ICTs are good at generating ‘weak ties’ – networks of (often fleeting) acquaintances that 
‘likes’ or ‘shares’ the same tastes (Della Porta and Mosca 2005). They are less good at 
fostering ‘strong ties’ – the deep connections of solidarity and commitment that 
undergird collective protest (Gladwell 2010; Bennett and Segerberg 2013: 50). This 
latter form of connection, best forged through personal ties of kinship and friendship, or 
in the midst of struggle, is not easily made. To the contrary, it costs. And it is not 
something that ICTs foster easily.  
 
 19 
The grander claims of cyber-enthusiasts do not, therefore, stand up to scrutiny. 
Revolutions always contain tools of communication: stories, rituals, banners, songs, 
cartoons, graffiti, and posters that mobilize protest through affective cultural 
performances (Selbin 2010; Tarrow 2012; Tripp 2013). Sometimes these symbolic 
repertoires are articulated through words, such as ‘patriot’ or ‘citoyen’, which acted as 
tools of certification denoting who was inside and outside the French revolutionary 
struggle (Tarrow 2012: ch. 10). Contemporary examples include the ‘Days of Rage’ that 
became critical points of identification during the Arab Uprisings. At other times, such 
repertoires are articulated in verse and song – the importance of the Egyptian guitarist 
Ramy Essam, the Tunisian hip-hop artist El Général, and the Syrian musician Ibrahim 
Qashoush to the Arab Uprisings take place within a longer tradition of revolutionary 
protest music (Clover 2009). Whichever form such tropes take, the key point is that 
analysts of opposition movements should direct attention to the message rather than 
the medium. During the Arab Uprisings, it was not ICTs per se, but the integration of 
these technologies within wider communicative ecologies based on strong, personal ties 
of trust that enabled protests to cohere (Bennett and Segerberg 2013: 88, 196). Most 
often, protestors gained their information through face-to-face communication or via 
word-of-mouth messages, the most trusted mediums of all.  
 
This analysis yields two points. First, like many contemporary revolutionary 
movements, the organizational character of the popular coalitions in North Africa and 
the Middle East was predominantly horizontal and decentralized. This made them 
highly participatory. But participation came at a price. Although good at galvanizing 
protests against incumbents, these movements were less successful at turning mass 
protests into coherent, enduring opposition forces. As a result, post-uprising pacts were 
made out of the reach of the popular coalitions that had been at the heart of the 
protests. Second, the use of ICTs had a range of effects, from connecting local and 
transnational networks to helping construct a new ‘ecology of dissent’ made up of an 
‘associational cluster’ of activist networks (Bennett and Sederberg 2013: 199). Crucially 
for the purposes of this article, although ICTs helped to raise levels of participation and, 
to some extent, co-ordinate protests, they did little to foster coherent, sustainable 
oppositional movements that would allow protestors to maintain pressure on their 
respective regimes. At times, ICTs proved to be a useful means of mobilizing protestors. 
 20 
But they did not help with the task of generating coherent movements able to sustain 
protest over the long haul.  
 
This speaks to a broader issue of direct concern to the literature on non-violent protest. 
As noted in the previous section, some scholarship in this tradition points to the 
importance of generating large, diverse coalitions (e.g. Chenoweth and Stephan 2011); 
others stress the need for internal cohesion within the protest movement (e.g. Pearlman 
2011). The analysis presented in this article suggests that each part of this literature is 
looking at different aspects of the same protest cycle. The former helps to explain why 
some revolutionary movements in North Africa and the Middle East were able to oust 
authoritarian regimes – the despots who led these regimes served as a common enemy 
and, thereby, a temporary point of unity around which diverse coalitions could 
mobilize. The latter makes clear why, after autocrats had been ousted, many 
movements were unable to consolidate their victories. The diversity of the coalition that 
helped them succeed in the first phase of the struggle worked against them in the 
second – participants shared a common short-term goal (to oust the dictator), but not a 
long-term vision of how political, economic, and symbolic relations were to be reforged. 
As a result, even when autocrats were overthrown, the aftermath of the revolutions saw 
elites sidestep revolutionary coalitions, decompress their challenge, or engage them in 
violent struggle. The result, as the next section shows, was considerable divergence in 
terms of the outcomes of the revolutions.10  
 
Revolution, Non-Violence and the Arab Uprisings 
The three issues discussed in the previous section – international dynamics, the role of 
the coercive apparatus, and the organizational character of opposition movements – 
help to explain both why the Arab Uprisings took place and why many of them have 
been unsuccessful. If the ‘minimum condition’ (Hobsbawm 1986; Stinchcombe 1999) of 
revolutionary success is the takeover of the principal means of production, means of 
violence, and means of information in a society, only Tunisia has passed this threshold. 
Despite widespread concern about the gradual pace of change in Tunisia, the Ben Ali 
regime has been ousted, a new constitution is in place, multi-party elections have been 
held, the military has been confined to barracks, the political police has been disbanded, 
and a range of commissions have been established to tackle corruption and related 
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activities. These are no small measures. In Egypt, by contrast, events since the 
overthrow of Mubarak have demonstrated the salience of ‘old politics’ over ‘new 
politics’ as the military, existing parties, mosques, and other entrenched interests have 
dominated the political landscape. In Yemen, although President Saleh was forced to 
resign in early 2012, demands for further concessions and, in some areas, secession 
speak to the likelihood of ongoing contention. Libya too is undergoing a period of 
considerable civil strife, although this does not match the scale of the bloodshed in 
Syria, where the failure of protestors to oust President Bashar al-Assad has led to the 
onset of a brutal civil war, one that has been internationalized by the emergence of 
‘Islamic State’, whose military campaigns in Syria and Iraq has prompted intervention 
by Western states.11 Bahrain’s uprising was crushed by a combination of monarchical 
obduracy and Saudi force. Through the vehicle of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 
the Saudi’s sent troops and police into Bahrain in order to secure the regime against 
protest, following this with large supplies of petrodollars in an attempt to appease 
protestors. The Saudi’s also gave Jordan a $1 billion ‘gift’ and offered a $4 billion ‘grant’ 
to Egypt, while mollifying domestic unrest through a reform package worth around 
$100 billion (Lynch 2012: 131; Matthiesen 2013: 129; Brownlee et al 2015: 54). GCC 
states also stoked sectarian identities in an attempt to divide opposition coalitions 
(Matthiesen 2013; Wehrey 2013). This threefold strategy of repression, aid, and 
sectarian polarization was initiated in a number of Gulf Monarchies, including Kuwait, 
Morocco, and Jordan, with similar results: the decompression of protest. Together, GCC 
states promised (even if they did not always deliver) billions of dollars of aid around the 
region, while simultaneously clamping down on opposition groups and mobilizing 
sectarian affinities in a counterrevolutionary strategy that acted as a brake on the 
uprisings.12  
 
Overall, therefore, the immediate outcomes of the 2011 uprisings can be split into four 
main groups: first, successful revolution (Tunisia); second, mixed outcomes in which 
autocrats have been deposed, but transformation has been limited (Egypt, Yemen); 
third, the decompression of protest through a combination of ‘authoritarian upgrading’ 
(Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Morocco, Jordan) (Heydemann 2013); and fourth, the 
emergence of violent polarization (Libya, Syria). As noted above, no state in the region 
bar Tunisia meets the minimum criteria of revolutionary change, let alone the 
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‘maximum condition’ of revolutionary success, understood as the systemic 
transformation of economic, political, and symbolic institutions (Hobsbawm 1986: 24). 
All in all, two-thirds of the region’s autocrats have survived the uprisings and even 
where they haven’t, as in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, the outcome has been ruinous 
(Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014: 326). In many cases, ‘dissidents made the first noises, 
but soldiers had the last word’ (Brownlee et al 2015: 63).  
 
In addition to the factors outlined in earlier sections of this article, there are two main 
reasons for this lack of success. First, revolutionaries in states outside the original onset 
of the crisis overstated the possibilities of revolutionary success. The uncertainty 
generated by the ousting of Ben Ali in Tunisia generated ‘cognitive shortcuts’: the 
propensity to place too much weight on dramatic news from elsewhere and the drawing 
of firm conclusions from relatively sparse information (Weyland 2012: 920-4). This is a 
common theme in revolutionary waves, but it was heightened in 2011 by two additional 
factors: the despotic character of states in the region, which meant that they had few 
institutional filters through which to channel information and meet grievances; and the 
relatively weak organizational capacity of the protest movements, as documented in the 
previous section. Second, once the wave had begun, regimes learned quickly. 
Oftentimes, revolutionary waves become less successful the further they travel from 
their original point of instigation (Beissinger 2007; Patel, Bunce, and Wolchik 2011; 
Della Porta and Tarrow 2012; Weyland 2012). This is the case for three reasons: 
because revolutionaries enact their protests in increasingly inhospitable settings; 
because authoritarian regimes learn how to demobilize their challengers; and because 
authoritarian state-society relations do not disappear overnight. In this sense, the 
Tunisian uprising was successful not just because of favorable international dynamics, 
the defection of the coercive apparatus, or the relative coherence of its opposition, but 
because it was the first such struggle in the region.  
 
This analysis suggests that those studying both revolutions and non-violent protests 
should be concerned less with the fact of the emergence of a revolutionary wave than 
with the timing of its emergence. This, in turn, provides two particular lessons for those 
working on non-violent protests. First, to date, much civil resistance theory and practice 
has focused on ways to oust authoritarian rulers. Less attention has been paid to what 
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happens after rulers have been deposed. The divergent outcomes of the Arab Uprisings 
make clear that just as much attention should be paid to developing post-conflict visions 
and strategies as there is on constructing opposition movements. It is one thing to oust 
a dictator; it is another to construct viable economies and systems of governance. 
Wendy Pearlman (2011) has noted the importance of organizational coherence to 
ousting dictators. But this is just as important to the post-struggle stage. In the 
aftermath of a successful revolution, diverse coalitions must be molded into well-
ordered movements that are able to govern. Key to their success is the articulation of a 
clear vision that is able to go beyond opposition and sustain a new government. Second, 
those non-violent protest movements operating once a protest cycle is underway 
should be aware that autocrats are sometimes fast learners. As a result, techniques and 
strategies that work in the early stages of a revolutionary wave are unlikely to work 
once the wave is underway. In these circumstances, rather than replicating earlier 
techniques and strategies of contention, protestors will need to innovate in order to 
keep pace with autocratic learning.13    
 
That the outcomes of the 2011 uprisings have been, in the short-term, one of largely 
unsuccessful revolution speaks to a broader set of questions about the place of 
revolution in the contemporary world. In general terms, the 2011 uprisings bare a 
family resemblance to the ‘negotiated revolutions’ that have become regular features of 
the post-Cold War world (Lawson 2004, 2005). ‘Modern revolutions’, a form of social 
transformation that emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and, it is 
argued, declined in the late twentieth century, are often defined as ‘rapid, basic 
transformations of a society’s state and class structures, accompanied and in part 
carried through by class based revolts from below’ (Skocpol 1979: 287). The core 
feature of modern revolutions was that they sought to transform political, economic, 
and symbolic fields of action simultaneously. Negotiated revolutions, by contrast, seek 
to transform political and symbolic fields of action, but without a concomitant 
commitment to a program of economic transformation (Lawson 2004, 2005).  
 
There are five main components of negotiated revolutions: their origins in a systemic 
crisis in which the role of the coercive apparatus is decisive; their rejection of armed 
confrontation; their formal acceptance of non-violence; their welcoming by liberal 
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international actors; and their fostering of weak rather than strong states (Lawson 
2004: 227-34; Lawson 2005: 482-91). All five of these components have been present, 
albeit in varying degrees, in the 2011 Arab Uprisings. First, the neo-patrimonial 
structure of regimes in the region made them vulnerable to changes in international 
relations, the defection of the coercive apparatus, and popular mobilization. What made 
the 2011 uprisings distinct from previous protest cycles was the defection of the 
coercive apparatus – without the support of the military, figures like Ben Ali and 
Mubarak could not survive. In contrast, where the military remained allied to state 
elites, regimes were able to endure. Second, even though protestors in some states 
forcibly deposed their regimes, few opposition coalitions had the capacity to engage the 
state in armed confrontation. In part, this was because of the illegitimacy of violence 
through its association with the security apparatus. In part, it was because the 
opposition, with the exception of Libya and Syria, did not contain a faction willing to 
take up arms in a concerted way.14 This, in turn, links to a third point – the formal 
association of the movements with non-violence. This embracing of non-violent 
repertoires made the Arab Uprisings more palatable to liberal international actors – the 
fourth characteristic of negotiated revolutions. As Barack Obama put it in the aftermath 
of Mubarak’s removal from office, ‘it was the moral force of nonviolence – not terrorism, 
not mindless killing, but nonviolence … that bent the arc of history’ (in Ritter 2015: 
169). Although support for the uprisings varied from case to case, there was a general 
sense amongst liberal international actors that the uprisings were legitimate, both in 
terms of their goal of ousting despotic regimes and in their formal support for non-
violence. Finally, because of the limited organizational capacity of opposition 
movements, even when depots have been ousted, state transformation has been limited. 
If the ‘robustness’ of authoritarianism in the region has been broken, the outlook for 
democratization is, at best, patchy (Bellin 2012).15  
 
The Arab Uprisings, therefore, share a familiar revolutionary heritage. In sociological 
terms, they sit largely within the framework established by the 1989 negotiated 
revolutions that ousted state socialism in Central and Eastern Europe, even if they 
depart from this schema in their lower levels of negotiation and higher levels of 
violence. In terms of wider currents of revolutionary theory, the 2011 uprisings belong 
to a stream of thought that both reinforces the legacy of 1989 and predates it. In broad 
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terms, both the Arab Uprisings and the collapse of state socialism can be said to sit 
within a family of ‘civilizing and democratizing’ (Selbin 2010) revolutions whose roots 
can be traced to the American Revolution of 1776. This places them within a distinct 
revolutionary tradition, one associated not only with 1776, but also with the 1848 
‘Springtime of Nations’. This tradition has further historical echoes, not least in the 
‘constitutional revolutions’ that took place during the early part of the 20th century in 
Russia, Iran, Portugal, Mexico, China, and the Ottoman Empire (Kurzman 2008). As 
noted in the introduction to this article, these cases served as the wellspring of later 
movements associated with non-violent protest. In the short-term, the constitutionalists 
were overthrown by an alliance of military elites, business groups, and great powers, in 
most cases after extended periods of civil strife. However, even if the revolutions of 
1905-12 were defeated in the short run, their main rationale (political liberalization) 
was more successful in the long run. That may also be the case for the 2011 Arab 
Uprisings. As a whole, the region is stuck between fragile pacts, illiberal renewal, and 
unmet grievances. The ‘deep state’ that characterizes the institutional connections 
between power brokers in the military, the state, the security services, and the private 
sector will not dissolve easily.16 However, these connections will have to cohabit with 
(at least partial) democracies and (at least partially) reformed monarchies in a volatile 
environment in which alliances are being renegotiated (Lynch 2012: 9). At the same 
time, mobilized publics appear willing to maintain ‘pressure from below’ in an attempt 
to secure lasting changes to the status quo. The conflict between authoritarian elites 
and democratic publics is likely to be a regular feature of political life in the region over 
upcoming years – the outcomes of the 2011 Arab Uprisings will be unfolding for some 
time to come. 
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1 Many thanks to Amnon Aran, Daniel Ritter, Nawal Mustafa, Neil Ketchley, the 
Mobilization peer reviewers, and especially Sharon Nepstad for their insightful 
comments on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks also to participants at presentations of 
the paper at LSE, Reading University, the International Studies Association convention 
in San Diego, the Social Science History Association conference in Toronto, and the 
World Congress of Sociology in Yokohama. The paper is much improved for its exposure 
to these various forms of public scrutiny.  
2 The obvious exception is the revolutionary strand of political Islam, which often 
combines hierarchical organization with an equally hierarchical vision (Bayat 2013: ch. 
12).  
3 The opposite condition also holds – those militaries that share a deeply embedded 
identity with a ruling elite are unlikely to defect. The obvious example in the context of 
the Arab Uprisings is Syria (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015: 55-8, 61). 
4 Unsurprisingly, the US was slow to fully endorse the protests against Mubarak. The 
initial message from the White House was that the US supported a ‘managed’ or 
‘orderly’ transition rather than a popular revolution (Holmes 2012: 400; Gerges 2013: 
415-6; Tripp 2013: 99). 
5 At the same time, the military became a powerful economic actor in its own right, 
controlling up to 15% of the Egyptian economy (Varol 2012: 346). The military ran 
farms and factories (often using conscripts as free labor), and owned a considerable 
portfolio of real estate.  
6 These examples illustrate that, although non-violence was a prescribed tactic of the 
protest movement, elements within it were willing to use violence. The balance to be 
struck between violent and non-violent protest was much discussed within the protest 
(Lynch 2012: 91-6; Cole 2014: 151; Gunning and Baron 2013: 193-201). It is important 
to note that, in the Arab Uprisings and elsewhere, there is often no straightforward 
either-or between violent and non-violent strategies. Indeed, these strategies have often 
existed side-by-side within the same protest movement (as in South Africa’s African 
National Congress) or have developed from one to the other (as in the Philippines 
during the 1970s and 1980s). In any assessment of this issue, the central issue revolves 
around whether there is a formal embrace of non-violence by the main strands of the 
opposition. For most, but not all, protest movements in the Middle East and North Africa 
during the 2011 uprisings, this condition holds. 
7 Again, radical Islamist groups provide the main exception. However, these groups 
tended not to be the main factions within opposition coalitions, even if the legacy of the 
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uprisings has been in many cases to strengthen the position of Islamists around the 
region.  
8 Crucial in this respect was the role of the Muslim Brotherhood, which formally joined 
the uprising at the end of January and thereafter took a leading role in protecting the 
protestors against the police and baltagiyya (Gunning and Baron 2013: 175).  
9 At other times, protestors used ICTs as decoys, while real demonstrations were 
organized through word of mouth (Gunning and Baron 2013: 284). 
10 My thanks to Sharon Nepstad for pushing me on some of the arguments in this 
paragraph.  
11 The existence (and relative success) of ‘Islamic State’, alongside other branches of 
radical Islamism, illustrates that the long-term association between revolutionary 
ideologies, hierarchy, and violence remains a potent force in the contemporary world.  
12 This brake is likely to be short-lived: by solving one problem (mass protests), states 
have generated a new one (the re-ascription of forms of categorical difference). They 
have also excluded Islamist parties from formal politics, with the exception of Ennahda 
in Tunisia and Morocco’s Justice and Development Party. The result of this exclusion, 
along with a decline in public support for Islamist parties, is likely to lead to a further 
radicalization of Islamist groups (Mecham 2014).  
13 Again, my thanks to Sharon Nepstad for emphasizing the importance of these points.  
14 Crucial here was the extent to which revolutionaries, including Islamists, felt that 
their goals could be achieved through a one-off historic compromise, as was the case in 
Tunisia. Where radical secularists were pitched in ‘exclusionary’ conflicts with virulent 
Islamists, as was the case in Libya and Syria, such compromises did not take place 
(Goldstone 2014b). On the general ‘modernization’ of Islamist parties, see: Gerges 
(2013); Hamid (2014); Ritter (2015).  
15 Around 75% of those polled for the 2014 Arab Barometer favored democracy as a 
system of governance, including 85% of Egyptians (Tessler 2014: 31). However, it is 
also clear that many Arab publics are somewhere between suspicious and fearful of 
Islamism, hence the wide support for the ‘restoration of order’ by various authoritarian 
forces around the region (Lynch 2014: 5, 7). 
16 This is no surprise. Personalist regimes are the least likely form of authoritarian 
governance to be replaced by democracies and the most likely to require violence to do 
so (Geddes et al 2014: 324-6).  
